Ukraine Needs a Reality Check more than Weapons
Who does not think that Ukraine is a Buffer State between the EU and Russia?
This blog post contains three articles:
Prof Richard Sakwa saying “Putin has a point in Ukraine” January 2022
My own article saying that Ukraine is important as a Buffer State” - 2015
Prof John J. Mearsheimer saying “Don't Arm Ukraine” from the same 2015
Well done to The Spectator and The New York Times for presenting these articles that provide an alternative to the NATO propaganda that our media mostly feed us.
RICHARD SAKWA
Whisper it, but Putin has a point in Ukraine
25 January 2022, 2:40 pm The Spectator
Around 100,000 Russian troops are currently massed on the Ukrainian border. Talk of an invasion fills the air. British intelligence claims President Putin is planning to install a Kremlin-friendly leader in Kiev. For the first time in at least a generation, there is the real prospect of war in Europe. It is easy for politicians in the West to talk about ‘Russian aggression’. What else is a massive build-up of troops if not an aggressive posture? But Russia is acting because its leadership feels threatened. From the high towers of the Kremlin, Ukraine looks like an increasingly hostile, American-backed Potemkin state.
It was not always this way. In the decade following the collapse of the USSR, the newly created Russian Federation had sought western integration. And not only via the rapid adoption of free-market capitalism. Initially, Vladimir Putin sought a security alliance and even membership of Nato. In this, he was following a path set out by Mikhail Gorbachev. In 1989, the last Soviet leader spoke of a ‘common European home’ stretching from the Atlantic to the Pacific. There was the possibility of a new order in which Russia would take its rightful place as a great power in a transformed western community.
Putin gave voice to similar sentiments in his September 2001 Bundestag speech: Russia’s destiny was to be a European one. Nevertheless, he insisted that the relationship could not be based on hierarchy, identifying the tensions that would later destroy the whole edifice of Russia’s relations with the West. Russia’s post-USSR leaders sought to join a transformed collective West to turn it into what would, with Russia’s membership, have become a greater West. Instead, Moscow was faced with an expanding Atlantic power system, with Russia firmly on the outside.
Since the era of German reunification, Moscow had been repeatedly assured that there would be no enlargement of Nato beyond a united Germany. Then in 1999, the alliance brought in the former Soviet countries of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. Five years later came the ‘big bang’ enlargement, encompassing another seven former communist countries (Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia). In February 2007, Putin condemned the dangers of establishing a ‘unipolar world’ and listed a range of strategic and security concerns, including the marginalisation of the UN, the installation of ballistic missile defences in Eastern Europe — and above all Nato enlargement. He stressed that Russia ‘with a thousand years of history’ did not need to be instructed on how to behave in international affairs. How did the West respond? With the accession of Albania and Croatia in 2009, Nato membership rose to 28. The addition of Montenegro and North Macedonian in the last five years has brought that number to 30.
Even now it could be argued that it is not so much Nato enlargement that is the problem but the way it was done, above all the absence of a larger pan-continental security framework in which Russia could be accommodated. Atlanticism was held to be supreme, overshadowing continental European, let alone Eurasian, models of regionalism.
Putin has naturally become obsessed with Ukraine — a crucial node in the antagonism between the West and Russia. His fixation is often explained in cultural and historical terms: he has spoken often of Ukraine and Russia as constituting one people. And many see his lament at the passing of the Soviet Union — ‘one of the greatest geopolitical catastrophes of the century’ — as an expression of a long-held desire to unite the two countries once again.
Here we see two processes of Atlanticism — the chosen model of state-building and growing geopolitical contestation — combining to devastating effect. The interaction between the two reinforced the view that Ukraine, in the aftermath of the Soviet Union’s collapse, had to be separated from Russia in all fundamental respects. The human rights of the Russophone population were ensured, but as a political constituency their concerns were denigrated. The 1996 constitution embraced a unitary model, thereby excluding federal devolution to the diverse regions (with the exception of Crimea).
Above all, Ukrainian was made the only state language, even though Russian is the native language of just under a third of the population, and a much larger proportion is fluent in the language. Russian was relegated ‘to the kitchen’ (as Russophone Ukrainians put it), and although prominent in the media it was gradually squeezed out of public institutions. This runs directly against the inclusive — even multicultural — trend practised everywhere else in the Atlantic world. Today Russian and other minority languages are effectively proscribed in the public sphere, provoking a shocking lack of condemnation from countries who like to think of themselves as part of the ‘league of democracies'.
In 2008, Ukraine was promised Nato membership — and although enlargement was not on the agenda in the Obama years, Russia feared then, as it does today, that a bilateral security deal with Kiev would create a bridgehead for US forces in the country. Fear that the crucial Black Sea port of Sevastopol would fall into Washington’s hands prompted the seizure of Crimea in March 2014. This was a defensive move, although couched in the expansive cultural terms of the reunification of the ‘Russian world’ — quite apart from being the freely-expressed wish of the great majority of the Crimean population.
Yet Russia’s aspiration for Ukraine is not as dramatic as it’s often made out to be. Nowhere has Putin suggested that he envisages a future single state, and there’s little reason to believe the Kremlin — hemmed in by a struggling economy, stagnant living standards, and a population which has demonstrated absolutely no appetite for dangerous foreign adventures — intends to reconstitute the Soviet Union. Instead, to protect its own security, Russia desires a neutral, friendly, multilingual Ukraine.
It is not an unreasonable wish. But as the western powers arm and encourage a militant and hostile neighbour — whether it comes to pass is far from certain. In the first Cold War, we emerged relatively unscathed from the Cuban missile crisis. This time around, with a real military threat on the doorstep of the USSR’s nuclear inheritor, we may not be so lucky.
Written by Richard Sakwa, professor of Russian and European politics at the University of Kent.
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ROBIN EDWARD POULTON
In Praise of Buffer States
Buffer states keep armies apart and allow important regional countries to trade in peace.
by Robin Edward Poulton - February 2015
A report issued end November 2014 by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in Geneva highlights the changing nature of warfare from bilateral and internal armed splits, to regional conflicts. One reason for this, is neglect by the United States and its NATO allies of an historical and geo-strategic truism: we need buffer states to avoid direct confrontation between regional powers.
The world was divided into Nation States after the collapse of great empires during the turbulent 20th century: after WWI in 1919, the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires were dismantled; after WWII we saw (starting with Indian and Pakistani independence in 1947) the collapse the British empire ‘on which the sun never set’ and then the French empire in Africa (beginning with the Algerian war of independence in the 1950s); and the Cold War brought the collapse of the Soviet empire in 1989. Many nation states and frontiers were created by the French and British: all of Africa and most of the Middle East are composed of states like Iraq, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon and Israel that never existed before 1916.
The USA, the world’s only super-power, is redrawing frontiers in order to control the world’s oil and mineral resources. NATO’s destruction of Iraq, Libya and the division of Sudan into two countries, for example, diminished Chinese and Russian oil contracts and led to regional armed conflicts that have infected neighboring states. The conflicts bring poverty and misery to millions of people; but they put millions of dollars in the pockets of the oil billionaires and arms manufacturers.
The Cold War brought peace because it respected a rule that every nation has interests. Trading patterns were regional rather than global: and where regional trade flourishes, peace generally thrives. Regional interests are reinforced by buffer states: states that keep major empires apart, forcing politicians and business leaders to use the skills of diplomacy and negotiation instead of imposing sanctions or brute force. Ask the Finns what it is like to live next door to the Russians. Ask the Nepalese how they enjoy being squashed between India and China. Ask the small Benelux countries (Belgium, Netherlands and Luxemburg) how they have survived the misfortune of being placed between the warrior nations of Britain, Germany and France. They all stay neutral because they negotiate, and smile.
No buffer state has suffered more than Afghanistan. The British failed in three wars to conquer the Afghans. Instead, a Pashtun emir called Abdul Rahman Khan gained British support to establish his kingdom in the 1880s, as a physical buffer between Imperial Britain and Imperial Russia. When the British empire disintegrated, the Soviet Union made the mistake of thinking it no longer needed a buffer state: but China, Pakistan and India all have regional interests, as well as the West. From 1979 until 1989 the Red Army fought and failed in the Afghan mountains. The US and the British fared no better after 2001: we are now trying to disentangle ourselves from the fourth Anglo-Afghan war, in which Washington and London have shared a bloody nose because both ignored the value of a buffer state.
The West is making the same mistake in Ukraine. A relentless eastward expansion of the European Union and NATO since 1989, has brought them to the borders of Russia. Ukraine is the last remaining buffer state. If NATO persists in trying in incorporate Ukraine into its military alliance, it will create conditions for armed conflict with Russia. Germany (= EU) and Russia have been rivals for centuries. Ukrainians and Americans will create war, unless they recognize Ukraine as a buffer state between the expansionist ambitions of Germany and Russia. No Ukrainian wants war: like every buffer state, they must learn to negotiate and smile.
Americans have always been quick to defend their own regional hegemony: sanctions against Cuba, invasions of Grenada and Panama, interference in Venezuela, Bolivia, Guatemala, Nicaragua are a given of US foreign policy. It should not be too difficult to understand that China, India and Russia have similar concerns in their own back yards. The role of Syria as a Russian buffer state resembles that of Ukraine and Afghanistan: recognizing this could bring a solution of the Middle East regional war that was started in 2003 by the ambitions of Dick Cheney and the ignorance of George Bush.
Syria has multiple buffers: it is perhaps the world’s most complicated buffer state! The Alawite regime is a spin-off from Shia Islam: since extremist Sunni sects believe that all Alawites must be killed, Bashar Al-Assad is fighting to avoid a genocide of his people. His regime is a buffer between Sunni and Shia expansionists (between Saudi Arabia and Qatar and Turkey and Iran). Syria is also a buffer between Israel and Sunni extremists like ISIS who want to destroy Israel. Western analysts often misunderstand Arabic and Persian linguistic hyperbole: Syria and Iran use Israel as a ‘enemy’ exactly as the Likud party uses them to bolster its power in Israel. Syria and Israel need each other.
Syria is also an important Mid-Eastern buffer state between Russia and the West. While America lies across the Atlantic Ocean, Russia is Syria’s close neighbor. Russia has an important naval base in Syria. Whatever happens in this region, takes place in Russia’s back garden. The most intelligent analysis of the Syrian conflict has come consistently from Mr Serguei Lavrov, Russia’s foreign minister. Far better than anyone living in Washington, Lavrov understands the dangers of a regional Arab war, and the importance of Syria as a buffer state. Even if NATO and the American government are deaf to the reports of the ICRC, they really need to listen to Mr Lavrov, and to recognize that all regional powers have regional interests that they have to buffer. Buffer states are really important: they allow countries to trade in peace.
[Dr Poulton is an international peace consultant with attachments to Virginian Commonwealth University (VCU), the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) and the academic Transcend Peace Network.
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JOHN J. MEARSHEIMER
The Opinion Pages | OP-ED CONTRIBUTOR
Don't Arm Ukraine
Feb 8, 2015 New York Times
The Ukraine crisis is almost a year old and Russia is winning. The separatists in eastern Ukraine are gaining ground and Russia’s president, Vladimir V. Putin, shows no signs of backing down in the face of Western economic sanctions.
Unsurprisingly, a growing chorus of voices in the United States is calling for arming Ukraine. A recent report from three leading American think tanks endorses sending Kiev advanced weaponry, and the White House’s nominee for secretary of defense, Ashton B. Carter, said last week to the Senate armed services committee, “I very much incline in that direction.”
They are wrong. Going down that road would be a huge mistake for the United States, NATO and Ukraine itself. Sending weapons to Ukraine will not rescue its army and will instead lead to an escalation in the fighting. Such a step is especially dangerous because Russia has thousands of nuclear weapons and is seeking to defend a vital strategic interest.
There is no question that Ukraine’s military is badly outgunned by the separatists, who have Russian troops and weapons on their side. Because the balance of power decisively favors Moscow, Washington would have to send large amounts of equipment for Ukraine’s army to have a fighting chance.
But the conflict will not end there. Russia would counter-escalate, taking away any temporary benefit Kiev might get from American arms. The authors of the think tank study concede this, noting that “even with enormous support from the West, the Ukrainian Army will not be able to defeat a determined attack by the Russian military.” In short, the United States cannot win an arms race with Russia over Ukraine and thereby ensure Russia’s defeat on the battlefield.
Proponents of arming Ukraine have a second line of argument. The key to success, they maintain, is not to defeat Russia militarily, but to raise the costs of fighting to the point where Mr. Putin will cave. The pain will supposedly compel Moscow to withdraw its troops from Ukraine and allow it to join the European Union and NATO and become an ally of the West.
This coercive strategy is also unlikely to work, no matter how much punishment the West inflicts. What advocates of arming Ukraine fail to understand is that Russian leaders believe their country’s core strategic interests are at stake in Ukraine; they are unlikely to give ground, even if it means absorbing huge costs.
Great powers react harshly when distant rivals project military power into their neighborhood, much less attempt to make a country on their border an ally. This is why the United States has the Monroe Doctrine, and today no American leader would ever tolerate Canada or Mexico joining a military alliance headed by another great power.
Russia is no exception in this regard. Thus Mr. Putin has not budged in the face of sanctions and is unlikely to make meaningful concessions if the costs of the fighting in Ukraine increase.
Upping the ante in Ukraine also risks unwanted escalation. Not only would the fighting in eastern Ukraine be sure to intensify, but it could also spread to other areas. The consequences for Ukraine, which already faces profound economic and social problems, would be disastrous.
The possibility that Mr. Putin might end up making nuclear threats may seem remote, but if the goal of arming Ukraine is to drive up the costs of Russian interference and eventually put Moscow in an acute situation, it cannot be ruled out. If Western pressure succeeded and Mr. Putin felt desperate, he would have a powerful incentive to try to rescue the situation by rattling the nuclear saber.
Our understanding of the mechanisms of escalation in crises and war is limited at best, although we know the risks are considerable. Pushing a nuclear-armed Russia into a corner would be playing with fire.
Advocates of arming Ukraine recognize the escalation problem, which is why they stress giving Kiev “defensive,” not “offensive,” weapons. Unfortunately, there is no useful distinction between these categories: All weapons can be used for attacking and defending. The West can be sure, though, that Moscow will not see those American weapons as “defensive,” given that Washington is determined to reverse the status quo in eastern Ukraine.
The only way to solve the Ukraine crisis is diplomatically, not militarily. Germany’s chancellor, Angela Merkel, seems to recognize that fact, as she has said Germany will not ship arms to Kiev. Her problem, however, is that she does not know how to bring the crisis to an end.
She and other European leaders still labor under the delusion that Ukraine can be pulled out of Russia’s orbit and incorporated into the West, and that Russian leaders must accept that outcome. They will not.
To save Ukraine and eventually restore a working relationship with Moscow, the West should seek to make Ukraine a neutral buffer state between Russia and NATO. It should look like Austria during the Cold War. Toward that end, the West should explicitly take European Union and NATO expansion off the table, and emphasize that its goal is a nonaligned Ukraine that does not threaten Russia. The United States and its allies should also work with Mr. Putin to rescue Ukraine’s economy, a goal that is clearly in everyone’s interest.
It is essential that Russia help end the fighting in eastern Ukraine and that Kiev regain control over that region. Still, the provinces of Donetsk and Luhansk should be given substantial autonomy, and protection for Russian language rights should be a top priority.
Crimea, a casualty of the West’s attempt to march NATO and the European Union up to Russia’s doorstep, is surely lost for good. It is time to end that imprudent policy before more damage is done — to Ukraine and to relations between Russia and the West.
John J. Mearsheimer, a professor of political science at the University of Chicago, is the author of “The Tragedy of Great Power Politics.”