How could the EU better support SALW management? (2009)

The main source of illegal weapons is government stockpiles

In all regions of the South, similar patterns of acquisition and handling of SALW emerge. The main source of illegal weapons is government stockpiles: ‘leakage’ is the accepted euphemism, and it covers disappearances by theft (large-scale or individual pilfering), illegal sale across frontiers, diversion of legal imports to covert destinations, and even renting out government rifles for hunting or criminal use.

There is a general rule that, “Every illegal weapons began life as a legal weapon.” This may not be true for tens of thousands of local weapons made by blacksmiths, but is generally true for the millions of military assault rifles that are used by rebel groups across the world. Most of these weapons originated in legal, government armories. If police and army are badly paid, or paid very late, it is understandable that they might be tempted to sell or rent out their guns to criminals.

It seems strange, but the RUF in Sierra Leone obtained many of its weapons and bullets from the very soldiers against whom they were then used. American soldiers sold their weapons to the Vietcong for drugs, and Russian soldiers did the same in Afghanistan, ignoring the fact that they might be killed by their own bullets and rifles. Current American and NATO policy in Afghanistan seems similar, as weapons and ammunition are distributed with almost no supervision or stockpile management controls.

Every illegal weapons began life as a legal weapon, and then “leaked” illegally

Leakage from poorly supervised stockpiles is also the largest source of illegal munitions and explosives (the latter often from mining company stores). The literature is filled with examples: Pézard (2006, 149-54) cites ‘loss or leakage’ in various countries, while Wilkinson (2006, 235) describes 50,000 rounds of ammunition disappearing inside Bosnia from stocks intended for Iraq. Those figures are small when compared to 2007 and 2008 US General Accounting Office audits in Iraq and Afghanistan of imported US stocks, that show hundreds of thousands of ammunition rounds ‘disappearing’ or ‘unaccounted for’.

A survey cited by Sivuyile Bam (AU) reveals that the South African police force ‘loses’ 4,000 SALW a month: this can be interpreted as illegal sales. If the officially disclosed figure is 4000, it can be assumed that the real number of ‘lost’ SALW is higher. Poor stockpile management is a worldwide problem. Private security companies create another frequent and growing source of illegal leakage and uncontrolled SALW availability.

Stopping leakages would be the single most effective measure that the EU funding could undertake, to reduce arms trafficking. In particular, ammunition is a potential choke-point, for a rifle without ammunition is pretty harmless. Fighting ends, when the ammunition runs out. While ‘leakage’ is a ‘local’ national problem, this is not a problem that can be tackled on a national, or even regional, level. Only Inter-Regional agreements that enforce inspections and audits of stockpiles will produce a satisfactory outcome.

The EU has had some successful experiences with stockpile management. In 2006, the European Union declared ‘victory’ and closed down the EU-ASAC project in Cambodia, widely considered the world’s most successful Security Sector Reform project. One of its achievements was the overhaul of the stockpile management system for all of Cambodia’s armed and security forces, including police, army, gendarmerie, navy and air force. In 2005 for the first time since the end of civil war, government and the Army High Command knew how many weapons and how much ammunition it had in every province, this in the country that is considered by the international community to have the largest reservoir of both legal and illegal weapons and explosives in the region. A computer management system ensured constant monitoring of weapons and explosive materials. In 2006 the EU wound up and closed the EU-ASAC project.

By 2008 the system was no longer functioning. Why? Because the Generals do not want oversight. Although the EU and Cambodia’s neighbors want good management of Cambodia’s arms and ammunition supplies, and although the civilian government, elected parliament and civil society all want professional oversight of the armed forces, this is not what the generals want. If the system fails, they generals can do what they like with their stockpiles. There is an important lesson to be learned here, even three:

- local political will and local control systems are often not strong enough to keep up rigorous stockpile management;

- it is far from certain that the EU can muster sufficient political will and European long-term commitment to compensate for local deficiencies.

- Maybe the EU has not analyzed sufficiently clearly its objectives: did the EU merely want to install computer systems, or do we seek real and continued management of Cambodia’s vast stockpile of weapons and ammunition?

If the international community wants to stop leakages from official armories, the full weight of the European Union needs to be brought to bear to bring political, diplomatic, economic and technical pressure on the armed and security forces in every region. If it requires a permanent European monitoring presence to keep vital oversight systems working, EU policies should be adapted accordingly.

Enforcing strict discipline over the use and management of weapons and munitions has the secondary benefit of improving the overall management of the uniformed forces. As in the case of the IAEA and nuclear storage, the European Union should support audits and inspections, and put in mechanisms and political pressure that ensure rigorous management of ammunition and weapon stocks by people whose real desire is that the management and monitoring systems will break down. Only Inter-Regional agreements that enforce inspections and audits of stockpiles will produce this satisfactory outcome and such a Concept could be adopted by the EU.